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Abstract: The recent adoption in Italy of a legislation stating
the full equivalence of digital and handwritten signatures gives
any institution with the appropriate requirements the
opportunity to act as Certificate Authorities (CA) for digital
signatures. This rises the question whether the CA role could be
of potential interest for the Italian banks. The present analysis is
focused on the Italian banking sector; however, some aspects
taken into consideration here may be in common with other
countries. Porter’s five forces model is used to show how the
Italian banks could leverage the advantageous cost asymmetries
given by their existing distribution channels to pursue
simultaneously cost leadership and differentiation, acting as
Certificate Authorities. Furthermore, they could build up new
complementary services and value for the customers around this
role. The lack of specific competences and assets together with a
number of tactical and strategical drivers suggests that these
new services could be object of outsourcing.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The paper is divided into 8 sections. Following this
introduction, section No. 2 briefly reviews the essential concepts
associated with the terms of ‘digital signature’ and ‘Certificate
Authority’. Section No. 3 describes the complex issue of the
legislative frameworks on digital signatures: different countries may
have divergent perceptions of the necessity for compulsory
identification of the parts in various economic activities.
Nevertheless, in some areas, like business-to-business transactions,
this necessity cannot be denied and a digital signature system with
full legal effects may be highly beneficial. Such a system was
recently adopted in Italy, giving rise to the question asked here,
whether the Italian banks could gain a competitive advantage
acting as Certificate Authorities. In section No. 4 the Certificate
Authority services are examined, using the well-known Porter’s
framework for structural analysis; as a result, the main strengths and
weaknesses for the banking system’s competitors are pointed out.
Sections No. 5 and No. 6 take into account direct and indirect
benefits of issuing the Certificate Authority services as a
complement for the banks’ core financial services. Section No. 7
enlightens how to overcome the lack of specific competence and
technology recurring to the outsourcing issue. The paper concludes
in section No. 8 giving a positive answer to the question assumed:
the role of Certificate Authorities could be used, leveraging a
privileged access to the distribution channels and with resort to
outsourcing, to build up new services and extensive relationships
with a high value for the customer.
II. DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES
Digital signatures are electronic substitutes for handwritten
signatures based on mathematical theory and on the use of

algorithms. They are created and verified by cryptography
and require that the holder of the signature owns a pair key
system for signing and for verification. One of the keys is
private and the other is public. Compared to other electronic
signatures, the digital signatures are more serviceable for
legal purposes, for their ability to ensure the message privacy,
integrity and authentication together with the signer
authentication and non-repudiation. Refer to [17] and [4] for
two sounds and thorough introductions on the topic
respectively from the technical and from the legal point of
view.
In general, the digital signatures system is based on the role
of a so-called “Trusted Third Party” (TTP), an institution
which originally verifies the identity of the parts and
guarantees its authenticity. The concept of trust is determinant
here, and there exists a vast literature on the topic; see [5] and
[22] for an overview, together with two recent models to
interpret the process of IT-based trust creation in electronic
markets. Usually the TTP is a Certificate Authority (CA)
which could be an individual, organization or agency - public
or private - acting as a “notary” to authenticate the identity of
users of a public-key system. The CA issues, manages and
revokes digital certificates, vouching for the identities of the
end user for which they are issued. Furthermore, the
Certificate Authority is responsible for the publication of the
public keys in a directory and for the maintenance functions
associated with them.
III. THE RAPIDLY CHANGING LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Italy, with the so-called “Bassanini law”, (law No. 59, 15
March 1997, art. 15), was the first country in the world to
establish a full legal equivalence of digital and handwritten
signatures. The same year, the Federal Republic of Germany
promulgated its “German Signature Law” (Informations- und
Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz, IuKDG, 1 August 1997).
The law states the conditions under which digital signatures
have legal value and binding. The regulations were
promulgated with the “Verordnung zur digitalen Signatur, 8
October 1997. In Italy, the regulations were published in
November 1997 (DPR 513/97) and the technical
specifications were finally produced with the D.P.C.M. dated
8 February 1999. The decree specifies, among the others, the
technological requirements and the standards adopted: for
example, art. 2 defines the admitted cryptographic algorithms
(RSA and DSA); art. 3 requires one of the two hash methods
in the standard ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998; in art. 4 the minimum
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key length is fixed in 1024 bits, etc. Several European
countries as well as countries in the rest of the world are now
considering or adopting a legal framework for the digital
signatures. Initiatives and efforts are being taken to set up a
common standard framework: the draft EU- directives
proposal (www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal/digital.htm), the
European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative
(ESSI, see the final report with a proposal for an European
standard [10]) and the “Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic
Signatures” in elaboration with the UN commission on
international trade law (UNCITRAL). For a general,
constantly updated survey, see [21].
Reference [4] is a comprehensive analysis of the digital
signature legislation in the European Community. The
authors identify three different approaches: “In the European
Community, some Member States adapted their legal
framework to electronic forms of documentation and
communication. Different possibilities of adaptation could be
found. (1) Rules proclaiming that every time a paper
document or penned signature is required by law, this
requirement can also be fulfilled by electronic means, such as
in Italy (general equivalence). (2) Specific legislation in
specific procedures accepting the use of electronic documents
and signatures such as in the Swedish customs legislation
(sectoral equivalence). (3) General rules concerning
evidential value (in civil, administrative, criminal, or all type
of litigation) proclaiming that electronic documents and
signatures can be used in court, such as the Belgian
adaptation of the Civil Code (equivalence in evidence). Other
Member States did not approve new legislation to provide
electronic signatures with legal consequences but adapted
their traditional legislative framework by interpretation in
doctrine (jurisprudence) and case law (jurisdiction), such as
in the United Kingdom.”
It’s possible to notice, with Anita Smith [18], that the
various legislation frameworks may reflect cultural
differences: there are contracts or activities for which, in
countries like Italy or Germany, the written form has
traditionally been an essential requirement, whereas for
instance in UK or in the US the compulsory identification of
the parts might have been unnecessary. The author (who, not
surprisingly, writes from UK) makes a comparative analysis
of the contracts or activities that require the identification of
the parts in different countries and concludes, a bit
provocative, that “[…] there are strong reasons why
organisations engaging in electronic commerce should not
seek to tie each transaction to a specific identifiable
individual.” This is certainly true with reference to
commercial transactions of low individual value (such as
CDs or books purchases). It is however questionable - as the
author herself points out in the discussion - in other important
areas of Electronic Commerce such as business-to-business
transactions. An example could be the communication
between a car manufacturer and its suppliers.
In Italy the digital signature system is now operational, and
the Government is acting to enforce the use of electronic
documents for administrative acts. The procedure to enable
the first Certificate Authorities has newly been initialised
with the processing of the first requests. Our regulation
explicitly requires that the Certificate Authority is a limited
company with the same minimum capital dimension and the
same requisites of honourableness requested for Italian banks.
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Fig. 1. Porter’s five forces model, adapted from [11], page 4.
A question not necessarily confined to the Italian
experience, naturally raises: how should the banks react to
this environmental change? Should they look at their
potential new role of Certificate Authorities as a strategic
opportunity or as an unnecessary burden which takes them
away from their core business? The following section applies
the well-known Porter’s five forces model to try to give an
answer to the question.
IV. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
This study is focused on the Italian financial sector which has
some specific characteristics, both from the legal and the
economic point of view. It is built on the well-known basic
conceptual framework introduced by Michael Porter [11] and
applied to the Italian financial sector. For an overview of the
relevant contributions on this subject, see Cecilia Rossignoli
[16]. Some of the aspects indicated below might be
generalized to other countries, especially to the European
countries that show similarities on the financial markets.
Another interesting issue, not addressed here, would be to
find out if the main conclusions would be different for other
countries.
Is it of interest for Italian banks to act as Certificate
Authorities for digital signatures? We can regard this
potentially new activity as a new service (CA service
henceforth) that the banks could offer to their customers.
Porter’s five forces model helps us to understand the strategic
issues related to this question. The model is depicted in figure
1 and it’s generally used for an industrial sector analysis.
Here the focus will be specifically on the CA service; the
analysis will be broadened in the following sections.
A. Potential Entrants
There is a significant entry barrier for the CA service,
which is, to use Porter’s words, the “access to distribution
channels” ([11], page 10). The Certificate Authority should
be able to physically identify the customers before assigning
them keys. This is possible via local branches on the territory.
Alternatively, it can be done only by delegating the customer
identification to other institutions or offices, (e.g. notaries,
local governments, etc) which means delegating a substantial
part of the CA service. Another entry barrier which is
peculiar in Italy and could be defined as a “cost disadvantage
independent of scale” ([11], page 11) is given by the
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requisites stated by the Italian law and regulations for the
Certificate Authorities. “The obligations of the Certificate
Authorities are so formed that the access to the role is
restricted to particularly solid economical subjects, […] and
the banks are the first ones to be considered” (translated from
[1]).
B. Substitutes
The threat of substitution for the CA service could be
associated with the services issued by notaries. According to
the existing legal framework, the Italian notaries can assume
certain functions linked to the digital signatures. An example
is the joint certification of authenticity, legality, correctness,
and correspondence to the will of parts, for the contracts
digitally signed in front of them. Indeed, the physical
presence of the contractors is still necessary in order to verify
the correspondence to the will of parts. This service, which
the Italian law recognises as ‘authentication of the digital
signature’ is actually complementary and not substitutive of
the CA service (D.P.R. 513/97, art. 16: “In order to
authenticate a digital signature, the public official shall
certify that the digital signature was affixed by the signer in
the presence of the official following verification of the
signer’s identity and the validity of the public key; that the
signed document reflects the signer’s will, and that it is not in
breach of existing law, as provided for in Section 28(1) of
Law No. 89 of 16 February 1913”). The Italian notaries form
a very loose network of independent professionals with low
possibilities to build up an economic entity with the requisites
stated by the law for the Italian CAs. Instead, they could
make use of the Certificate Authorities services to build up on
them their own value. Other entities, like the well known
Verisign hierarchical network, could attract bank customers
and offer an alternative CA service. Verisign is a hierarchical
structure with a Certificate Authority on the top issuing the IT
services and other conventioned local institutions/officers at
the bottom, personally contacting the customers. However,
the Certificate Authority should possess all the law requisites
necessary. This is not the case now for Verisign in Italy. It is
also difficult to build up such a structure in Italy in
competition with the quite efficient distribution channels of
the banks’ office branches.
C. Bargaining Power of Buyers
The CA service buyers’ power is presumably quite high
because of the low buyers’ switching costs, the
standardization of the service and the low direct profit
presumably generated by low pricing policies wich will be
discussed herein after. The key of the differentiation might
again be the distribution channel. The perceived quality of the
CA service could be linked with the easy reach of local
offices for first-time authentication. It is quite natural for a
bank’s customer to reach the nearest branch office of his/her
preferred bank.
D. Bargaining Power of Suppliers
The CA service is based on an important technological
infrastructure. The service requires a specific knowledge,
specific skills and a specific technology, which are not
typically present in the Italian banking structure. The main
consequences are that the dependence on technology
suppliers would be high and that important investments
aswell as organizational efforts should be faced. As

enlightened in section VII, outsourcing could be a good way
to overcome these types of difficulties.
E. Rivalry Among Competitors
At present, there are not yet active competitors in Italy for
the CA service, but the first requests are currently being
processed. Presumably, there will be only a small number of
big institutions directly issuing technology services for public
keys certification. A viable option for the banks, discussed in
section VII, might be outsourcing the technology services. On
the CA service, there might be a competition among banks
and a competition between banks and other actors.
Outsourcing could lower the exit barrier given by investments
in technology. On the other side, the entry barrier formed by
access to distribution channels could be determinant in the
competition between banks and other institutions.
F. Generic strategies: cost leadership/differentiation
In the analysis of the five competitive forces given above,
one of the key aspects is the availability of the bank
traditional distribution channels. With the massive usage of
IT and of alternative distribution channels, the banks could
have difficulties in finding a way to reduce costs associated
with the branch structure, facing important strategic risks,
which are named in a recent report by the European Central
Bank “worsening excess capacity problems and unsustainable
cost structures” ([3], page 35). On the other side, to build up a
network of local branches for the CA service distribution,
important investments and organizational efforts would be
required by non-banking actors, even if the choice would be
made to build up a hierarchical service network in
conjunction with other affiliated entities. From this point of
view, the ready availability of their own distribution channels
may enable the banks to point to the cost leadership for the
CA service, and to reduce the excess capacity. Moreover,
leveraging the easy reach of their local branches, the banks
may differentiate themselves from other eventual nonbanking competitors. A strong brand name could be leveraged
as well. The presence of an advantageous cost asymmetry in
the distribution of the CA service is often balanced by the
lack of specific competence and IT assets, which has to be
overcome (see below, section VII). The (usually rare)
coexistence of cost leadership and differentiation in the CA
service might move the banks to be aggressive, offering it in
bundle with their core business services, setting competitive
prices and gaining further indirect advantages (see the
following sections). How can the Italian banks further
leverage the aspects evidenced above to gain a competitive
advantage and improve their competitive position in the
financial sector? In the following sections, we will make use
of some classical analysis tools introduced in [12] to try to
answer to this question.
TABLE I
CUSTOMER ACTIVITIES AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
Digital signature-enabled
customer activity
Real estate transactions

Related financial services
Mortgage loans, personal loans

Business to business transactions,
contracts, sales

Commercial intermediation, risk
hedging, funding, securities …

Trading

Intermediation; sale of financial
products; risk hedging …
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V. THE CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY SERVICE AS A
COMPLEMENT
The concept of complementary product/service discussed
by Michael Porter in [5], chapter 12, is one of the main
factors which makes the CA service potentially interesting for
the banks. As known, a complementary service is typically
associated by the consumer with another service or product,
and the selling of one can promote the selling of another. The
use of the digital signature could be associated with activities
regulated by the digital counterpart of a written contract, such
as the real estate transactions. These activities could represent
a fertile ground for the sale of other ‘core’ financial services
such as mortgage loans. Table No. 1 gives a sample list of
some of these activities with the corresponding related
financial services.
VI. INDIRECT ADVANTAGES: BUILDING EXTENSIVE
RELATIONSHIPS AND CUSTOMER NETWORKS
The CA service is basically an identification service with
the advantage of making it possible to ‘sign’ contracts and
documents
online
and
of
enabling
confidential
communication. The Certificate Authority, being a bank,
could try to add value to this basic offer building additional
services around. In today’s economy and especially in ecommerce, the creation of new products and services is often
possible and preferable to the purely defensive strategy. As
Kim and Mauborgne recently pointed out [8], “Competition
based strategy […] has waning power in today’s economy in
which, in many industries, supply exceeds demand.
Competing for a share of contracting markets is a marginal
and “second best” strategy. […] A “first-best” strategy in
today’s economy stimulates the demand side of the economy.
It expands existing markets and creates new markets”. An
interesting possibility to leverage the CA service creating
value for the customer would be to create web based
customer networks and communities around the main
customer activities centered on digital signature. For instance
a customer network for real estate contracts with on line
services ranging from real estate agencies to contractual and
fiscal consultancy, from financing to contacts with architects
and interior- or design experts. Some of these services are
already starting to be partially offered off-line by a few Italian
banks (as Banco Ambrosiano Veneto with the bundle offer
named ‘mutuo casa’). Similar initiatives could be tailored to
specific needs in the corporate market as well. The creation of
customer networks not only links the customer to the bank
raising his material and immaterial switching costs, but can
also help to sustain the prices and to avoid price comparisons
with competitors. Grover and Ramanlal [6] call these
communities “captive buyers networks”. “In fact, the
consumer is part of a captive buyer network because there is
time, information and possibly financial cost to exiting the
subject and registering for another one to compare products.”
Issuing the CA service could also contribute to enhance the
overall level of the bank’s customer satisfaction. A recent
study by Krishnan, Ramaswamy, Meyer and Damien [9]
states that one of the drivers for customer satisfaction in
financial services is the satisfaction withof product offering,
followed by the satisfaction with the quality of the services
from the distribution channels. Both these aspects may clearly
be improved leveraging the CA service.

VII. OUTSOURCING THE CA SERVICE
The continuing growth of new potential services, including
the CA service, provides banks with the opportunity to reassess the question of which activities should remain in
house, and which activities should be sourced from outside,
whether by purchase or through forms of cooperative
agreement [7],[2]. Quinn and Hilmer [15] suggest ways to
answer to the question. Two new strategic approaches, when
properly combined, allow managers to leverage their banks’
skills and resources for increased competitiveness:
1) Concentrate the bank’s own resources on a set of “core
competencies” where it can achieve definable preeminence
and provide unique value for customers [14];
2) Strategically outsource other activities – including many
activities considered traditional integral to the bank – for
which the bank has neither a critical strategic need nor special
capability [13].
If we apply these approaches to a typical Italian bank
issuing the CA service it appears immediately clear that the
CA service is usually not a core service. It does not represent
a critical strategic need and the bank is not provided with the
special capabilities to offer this kind of service (it does not
own the technology leadership).
According to the results of a recent survey from “The
Outsourcing Institute” [20], behind a bank decision to
outsource the CA service, a number of drivers can be
individuated: some of them are tactical, others are strategical.
Tactical reasons to recur to the outsourcing are based on
the following facts:
1) It reduces operating costs. An outside provider’s lower
cost structure, which may be the result of a greater economy
of scale or other advantage based on specialization reduces a
bank’s operating costs and increases its competitive
advantage.
2) Some resources are not available internally. New
organizations, spin-offs or banking expanding into new
geography or new technology should consider the benefits of
outsourcing from the very start.
On the other hand, the strategical reasons are:
3) It improves bank focus. Freed from devoting energy to
areas that are not in its expertise the bank can focus its
resources on meeting its customers’ needs.
4) It accelerates reengineering benefits. Reengineering
aims dramatic improvements in critical measures of
performance such as cost, quality, service and speed.
5) It allows the access to world class capabilities. Worldclass providers make extensive investments in technology,
methodologies and people.
6) It reduces risk. Markets, competition, government
regulations, financial conditions and technologies all change
extremely quickly and outsourcing providers make
investments on behalf of many client, not just one.
7) It frees resources for other purposes.. Outsourcing
permits an organization to redirect its resources from noncore activities toward activities that serve the customers.
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Swamidass [19] suggests that an evolutionary process in
global sourcing consist of three stages: cost minimization,
competitive advantage and strategic asset. As customer
satisfaction is becoming a central lever for the business
tactics, competitive advantages of the banks focus on the
ability to create a major value for the customer in terms of
quality, service and product innovation. In this study, these
three stages are joined together since a bank - externalizing
the CA service - could simultaneously minimize the costs,
gain and sustain competitive advantage and join the strategic
asset.
Practical evidence is given by the service SSB provides to
its customers. SSB is an Italian outsourcer of banking
services, owned by several major Italian banks. One of its
offers, named SSB-CA (http://ca.ssb.net) gives the customer
the possibility to implement its own Certificate Authority at a
low cost and with all the requirements stated by the Italian
law and regulations, including the level of logical and
physical security. The offer of SSB-CA is built ad hoc in
order to satisfy the customer’s needs, including the planning
and design of a customized CA service, the use of the SSB
technological infrastructure and a users help desk.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The answer to the research question is positive: acting as
Certificate Authority could represent a strategic opportunity
for the Italian banks. A critical success factor may be the
access to the distribution channels, which could be
determinant to reach the cost leadership (and to some extent,
differentiation) in these specific services against the nonbanking competitors. Another important success factor may
be the use of the CA service as a complement, to build up
new high value services and extensive relationships with the
customers. A third, determinant success factor may be the
resort to outsourcing. Further extensions to this analysis could
be based on more advanced strategic analysis frameworks and
models. Another natural object for further research would be
the application of this analysis to other countries, evidencing
differences and similarities.
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